'DUST DEVILS'
The 21st Special Operations Squadron
was a consolidation of two Squadrons which occurred on the 19 September 1985.
The two units were the 21st pursuit Squadron & the 21st
Helicopter Squadrons.
The 21st Pursuit Squadron was constituted on 22 December 1939 & activated on 1 February 1940 at Moffett Field, California. It was assigned to the 35th Pursuit Group until 15 January 1942 & attached to the 24th Pursuit Group, c.20 November 1941 flying P-36’s from 1940 util they were replaced by P-40’s in 1941. The squadron saw combat in the Philippine Islands, from 8 December 1941 until c. 1 May 1942 and a ground echelon fought as infantry in Bataan, from 18 January until c. 8 April 1942. It was not operational from the fall of the Philippines until its inactivation on 2 April 1946.
The 21st Pursuit Squadron was constituted on 22 December 1939 & activated on 1 February 1940 at Moffett Field, California. It was assigned to the 35th Pursuit Group until 15 January 1942 & attached to the 24th Pursuit Group, c.20 November 1941 flying P-36’s from 1940 util they were replaced by P-40’s in 1941. The squadron saw combat in the Philippine Islands, from 8 December 1941 until c. 1 May 1942 and a ground echelon fought as infantry in Bataan, from 18 January until c. 8 April 1942. It was not operational from the fall of the Philippines until its inactivation on 2 April 1946.
The Squadron provide the U.S. Army with air support in a fashion like the TAC Troop Carrier Squadrons. It was authorized 38 officers and 91 airmen to fly & support the H-21, the unit was assigned 29 officers & 89 airmen & attached to the 63rd Troop Carrier Wing, Donaldson AFB, South Carolina. The Army declined all support from the Air Force helicopters & the Squadron turned to fly airlift support, search and recovery missions & cooperated with a communications group in an experiment to lay communications lines by helicopter. The unit flew photo, airlift & radiological survey missions during atomic testing at the Nevada Test Site prior to inactivation on 15 October 1957.
A couple of designs from the early years as a Helicopter Squadron.
It reactivated on 30 June 1967, assigned to Tactical Air Command, it was organized on 15 July 1967 at Shaw Air Force Base, South Carolina under the 507th Tactical Control Group.
The Squadron was reassigned to the 56th Air Commando Wing (which later, 56th Special Operations Wing), on 27 November 1967 & moved to Nakhon Phanom RTAFB, Thailand operating the CH-3E (until 1971). The Squadron was redesignated as the 21st Special Operations Squadron on 1 August 1968.
Another pair of early Special Operation patches.
In early 1968 several flight crews and
aircraft were taken from the 20th Helicopter Squadron, “Pony Express”, at Udorn
to begin the 21st mission. The former 20th aircrews were experienced in
classified operations in Laos and North Vietnam and would add to the
capabilities in missions that the 21st would eventually become involved. The
likeliest method of improving intelligence coverage seemed to be a system
originally designed to ferret out trucks entering South Vietnam by way of Laos
and the Ho Chi Minh trail.
Sensors were thrown out of the side of the Squadrons CH-3's.
(USAF Centre of Military History)
This surveillance system involved the use of
electronic sensors, seismic and acoustic, (left: dropping sensors from the CH-3's (USAF Photo) accurately implanted along known or
suspected routes of North Vietnamese infiltration. These devices broadcast to
an orbiting airplane, in this case a specially equipped Lockheed EC-121 which
relayed the signal to an infiltration surveillance centre at Nakhon Phanom in
Thailand. Those highly advanced computers would correlate the data coming in
"real-time" from thousands of sensors we would dropped on and around
the Ho Chi Minh Trail to stop the infiltration of both supplies and troops into
South Vietnam. Prior to the arrival of the 21st Helicopter Squadron, a Navy
squadron, using OP-2E aircraft delivered sensors over the trail. The Navy lost
several aircraft in just a few weeks after having worked successfully for some
time and the decision was made to withdraw them from their perilous mission.
This would be the 21st SOS new primary mission!
The last 21st SOS CH-3 shot down on a
sensor drop mission was in Feb 1969. After several such losses, the AF decided
that placing sensors with helicopters wasn't viable & transferred the
mission to the F-4s.The need for heavy-lift capability beyond that of the CH-3 became an increasing priority. During 1967 U.S. Army Chinooks and Marine CH-53s were sent to north Thailand from Vietnam on ten occasions for a total of ninety-six days. CH-54s were also flown from Da Nang on several subsequent occasions to lift artillery, damaged aircraft, generators, and other items in Laos. To meet such needs, the Seventh/Thirteenth Air Force in early 1968 requested that several heavy-lift choppers be permanently based at Udorn. MACV was unwilling to spare these craft from Vietnam and instead recommended that the Air Force procure its own CH-53s. On the 20 April 1968, the Secretary of Defence, approved the procurement of twelve CH-53s for this purpose. The first CH-53C joined the Squadron in August 1970, beginning a changeover period not completed until December 1971. The CH-53s thus became the Air Force's first heavy-cargo helicopter, with twice the power of the CH-3E and three times the latter's load-carrying capacity.
In September 1970, the Squadron flew eleven CH-3E helicopters and one new CH-53 helicopter, which was referred to as "BUFF," for "big, ugly, fat fellow". Cross-border helicopter activity reached a maximum in 1969 and early 1970. The missions from Thailand were secondary responsibilities of a detachment of the 20th Squadron at Udorn and the 21st Special Operations Squadron based at Nakhon Phanom. Distances to the Prairie Fire and Cambodian operating areas were great, and each Thai-launched mission meant two crossings of the enemy's main panhandle infiltration corridors. The high altitudes needed to assure safety from ground fire during these crossings were hard on engines, so crewmen often criticized Prairie Fire missions from Thailand, except when weather obviously prevented take-off from Vietnam. The CH-53s generally operated in pairs with one staying high at the landing zone ready for emergency rescue. Crews used steep approaches and relatively high speeds for the final approach. Forward air controllers often coordinated fire suppression and helped to find the landing zone. Escort fighters accompanied most missions, with propeller-driven
A-1Es preferred to jet fighters because of their slower speed, superior manoeuvrability, and greater endurance. Some CH-53s had miniguns for self-protection. Precautionary tactics held CH-53 losses in the Prairie Fire region to a single ship downed in February 1971.The necessity of replacing all Southeast Asia personnel every twelve months strained the Air Force's thin reservoir of experienced helicopter pilots, especially in the later years of the war. One expedient was to train experienced fixed-wing pilots in rotary-wing flying, in many cases selecting older officers who had not flown in recent years. Such individuals, after graduating from the helicopter school at Sheppard AFB went through tactical training in the CH-53 at Shaw. After reaching Nakhon Phanom, everyone received further checkout and upgrade training under squadron instructors. Of thirty-nine pilots assigned to the Squadron in mid-1970, only ten had previous rotary-wing experience. Twelve were lieutenant colonels although only one lieutenant colonel was authorized. In another measure, taken largely in response to congressional pressure, the Air Force abandoned its policy that helicopter pilots should first be rated in fixed-wing aircraft. Beginning in late 1970, candidates without fixed-wing ratings entered a 190-flying hour helicopter training program conducted by U.S. Army. Along with its many other responsibilities the 21st Squadron increasingly made tactical troop lifts, hauling Meo & Laotian battalions in airmobile assault & reinforcement operations. In the later years of the war, the history of the whole allied airlift effort in Laos, including contract, Royal Laotian Air Force, and USAF helicopter & fixed-wing arms, became increasingly involved in the campaigns on the ground.
Allied defeats continued into early summer of 1969 and were climaxed with the evacuation and loss of Muong Soui. A helicopter task force assembled at Long Tieng on June 27 for the Muong Soui evacuation ten from 20th and 21st Squadrons, three HH-53s from the Air Force air rescue unit in north Thailand, and eleven Air America H-34s. Withdrawal of a 350-man Thai unit began that afternoon and was completed in two hours, after which evacuation of Laotian troops and families began. One 21st SOS CH-3 was shot down, but crews and passengers stood off enemy troops with rifles and grenades until picked up by an Air America H-34. The evacuation continued the next day, always plagued by difficult weather. Air attaché officers praised the aircrews of the unarmed and vulnerable helicopters who time and time again descended into the enemy-controlled area at minimum altitude and airspeed, crammed their burdens into the over grossed machines, and staggered out of the area to the Long Tieng sanctuary. These deeds should not noted to the men of the Air Force helicopter units and their comrades of Air America, Inc.
Allied helicopters again were in the forefront of Pao's counteroffensive, Operation Leapfrog. Leapfrog began on the 18 August 1970, with the insertion of five hundred government troops at the rim of the Plain of Jars by Air Force and contract helicopters. A climax for the 21st SOS occurred in the last week of November with the unit lifting nearly two thousand troops and equipment from Long Tieng to a landing zone near Ban Ban, well east of the plain. Compared with the successes of About Face, those of Leapfrog were small and no more permanent. The enemy reclaimed the initiative in early-year pushes against Long Tieng in 1971 and 1972. In both campaigns, allied helicopter and fixed-wing transport forces again provided Long Tieng's only transportation link to the outside.
On 29 and 30 April 1975, eight of the Squadron's CH-53s participated in Operation Frequent Wind, operating from USS Midway. Operation FREQUENT WIND, the evacuation of Vietnam in April 1975, moved over 50,000 people. The initial decision to depart Saigon was made to evacuate the Defence Attaché's office by fixed-wing aircraft. This fixed-wing evacuation was determined impossible when hostile artillery and rocket fire closed the air base at Tan Son Nhut. The decision to evacuate the entire US presence by helicopter under Operation Frequent Wind was made late morning, 29 April 1975, Saigon time. Due to the delayed timing of the order, the capability for rapid response to such an order was imperative. The deteriorating situation at the Defence Attaché location required the Embassy to become a major site.
The evacuation of the Defence Attaché people proceeded smoothly. Total casualties were relatively light: two USMC Embassy Security Guards killed in an attack by ground fire, and two USMC CH-46 SAR helicopter aircrews presumed dead following a crash at sea. Total evacuation helicopter sorties from the US defence Attaché compound numbered 122. The sorties from the US Embassy numbered 72. The evacuation of 7,806 US citizens and foreign nationals from these two places by the US Air Force and Marine Corps helicopters was supported by a major air effort by the Air Force and Navy. This effort consisted of: 444 USAF/USMC helicopter sorties; 204 TACAIR sorties; 24 AH-1J (Cobra) combat escort sorties; 8 AC-130 gunship sorties; 5 EC-130 (ABCCC) sorties; 44 KC-135 tanker sorties; and 2 HC-130 search and rescue support sorties.
The 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade, a task force of the III MEF successfully extracted by helicopter more than 7,000 Americans and Vietnamese from Saigon, Vietnam, in Operation Frequent Wind. In conjunction with this operation, Marine detachments from III MEF provided security of U.S. ships engaged in carrying Vietnamese refugees to Guam.
The Mayaguez incident took place in the Gulf of Thailand in May 1975. It began when Cambodian gunboats stopped and boarded the American cargo ship SS Mayaguez on 12 May, one month after the end of the Vietnam War. The Cambodians took the crew prisoner and moved the ship toward Koh Tang Island off the Cambodian coast. Considered an act of piracy by the United States Government, the U.S. military received orders to locate the seized vessel. After a U.S. Navy P-3 Orion located the ship off Koh Tang on 13 May, two USAF F-111 aircraft arrived on scene. That night, an AC-130 Spectre gunship circulated over the island, keeping an eye on the situation. Throughout the day and into the evening, Cambodian gunboats travelled to and from the ship, the island, and the Cambodian mainland. U.S. and Cambodian forces exchanged fire and several gunboats were damaged or destroyed.
A
task force was drawn up with volunteers from the 56th Security
Police Squadron & helicopters from the 21st SOS & 40th ARRS. On the 13 May the helicopters were relocating to a base to
set up the rescue mission when Knife 13 crashed, killing all on board.
|
Knife 13 CH-53C #68-10933
|
|
1Lt Jimmy Kays-P
|
|
1Lt Larry Froehlich-CP
|
|
TSgt George McMullen-FE
|
|
Sgt Paul Raber-FE
|
|
Sgt Robert P. Weldon-FE
|
USAF security policemen assigned to the 56th
SOW, Nakhon Phanom RTAFB Thailand, aboard a Super Jolly Green Giant callsign
"Knife 13" of the 21st SOS. The crew of five and the 18 passengers
airmen died when the helicopter crashed 64 km west of the airfield on 14 May
due to a mechanical malfunction, about one hour after this photo was taken. A
main rotor blade separated from head in flight.
On 14 May, USAF aircraft continued strafing enemy gunboats and vessels in the area to prevent them from reaching the mainland. However, one fishing vessel that made it to the mainland, and unbeknownst to U.S. forces at the time, carried the crew of the Mayaguez.
Early on 15 May, after diplomatic efforts had failed to secure the crew's release, U.S. forces received orders to seize the Mayaguez and recover the crew. The operation, hastily planned by 7th AF, initially included USAF Security Forces to secure the ship and locate the crew, who were thought to be held on the island. However, one of those helicopters crashed (Knife 13), killing its Air Force crew and all 19 Security Forces personnel aboard while on its way to U–Tapao RTNAF, Thailand, the base the Squadron would operate from, from the 14 to 16 May. When that happened, planners decided to use U.S. Marines. Although USAF C-141 Starlifters transported the Marines to staging areas in Thailand, USAF helicopters would play the major role in the operation. A total of 14 USAF helicopters, both HH-53 Jolly Green and CH-53 Knife helicopters were used. The hastily put together plan called for three helicopters to transport U.S. Marines to the destroyer, USS Harold E. Holt, which would then seize the Mayaguez. Eight additional helicopters would transport more Marines to two landing zones on the Eastern and Western sides of the northern tip of Koh Tang Island. The two landing zones were separated by a thin island neck about 1,100 feet across. However, because of the quick planning, the assault force had little intelligence on the number of Cambodian forces on the island and whether or not the crew was being held there. Still, a rescue attempt had to be made. As it turned out, the crew was not on the island and Cambodian forces were much stronger and entrenched than expected. Approximately 230 Marines boarded helicopters for the assault on the island and the ship. They did so with little knowledge or expectation of what they would find.
Three helicopters (Jolly 11, 12 & 13) delivered their troops to the USS Holt, who then successfully boarded the Mayaguez and found it abandoned by the Cambodians. While that part of the assault went as planned, the same could not be said for the assault on Koh Tang Island. As planned, the helicopters attempted simultaneous insertions on the Eastern and Western beaches at dawn.
On the Western beach, Knife 21 and Knife 22 made their approach and came under intense enemy fire that included automatic weapons, rockets, rocket propelled grenades, mortars, and unrelenting small arms fire. As soon as the Marines clambered off Knife 21, the helicopter struggled out to sea but crashed one mile off shore. Knife 22 also attempted to insert its Marines but came under such intense fire it aborted its landing and sustained so much damage that it barely made it back to the Thai mainland.
Knife 32 then came into the landing zone, and while it managed to unload its Marines, it sustained such severe damage that it too barely made it back to the mainland carrying a critically injured flight mechanic. While the situation was grim
on the Western beach, a far worse situation developed on the Eastern beach as the first helicopters, Knife 23 and Knife 31, came in. The Cambodians held their fire as the two helicopters approached. But as soon as Knife 23 hovered over the beach, the enemy opened up with such intense fire that Knife 23 crashed onto the beach. Somehow, 20 Marines and an Air Force photographer scrambled off the downed helicopter and into the trees while the crew powered down the helicopter. As Knife 23 was crash landing on the beach, its pilot saw Knife 31 burst into flames in mid-air. A direct hit by a rocket or rocket propelled grenade severely injured Knife 31's pilot and killed the co-pilot and the helicopter went down at the edge of the beach in the water. Still, 18 of the 26 Americans on board survived that crash and exited the helicopter only to come under intense enemy fire as they tried to swim out to sea out of range of the enemy's weapons. All told, 13 men lost their lives in the crash of Knife 31. In spite of the tragedy unfolding on the Eastern beach, the co-pilot of Knife 23, Lt John Lucas, as well as a Marine forward air controller who had survived the crash of Knife 31, used their survival radios to call in close air support, provided by USAF A-7s, which attacked enemy positions in the thin strip of land between the two beaches. One hour after the assault began, only 54 Americans were on the island and 14 others had perished.
Soon, the last three Air Force helicopters carrying the initial wave of Marines approached the Western beach. While under intense enemy fire, Jolly 42 and Jolly 43 managed to unload their Marines. Jolly 41 made several attempts to land but aborted because of enemy fire and left to refuel. At that point, there were 109 Marines and 5 Air Force crewmembers on the island, pinned down by heavy enemy fire. One of the helicopters that had delivered Marines to retake the Mayaguez, Jolly 13, orbited off Koh Tang to conduct Search and Rescue. After Knife 23 and Knife 31 went down on the Eastern beach, Jolly 13 attempted a rescue but the enemy fire was so intense and the helicopter damaged so severely that it aborted its rescue attempt and struggled back to the mainland. After the failed rescue attempt, USAF A-7s, F-4s and a Spectre AC-130 gunship stepped up their strafing and bombing attacks on the enemy positions. Meanwhile, Jolly 41, which had refuelled, returned to try and unload more Marines on the Western beach. After several attempts, Jolly 41 managed to unload all but 5 of its Marines, but it too returned to its staging base so severely damaged that it could not be flown again. With the departure of Jolly 41, the initial assault wave was complete. There were 131 Marines and 5 Airmen on the island. 82 were on the Western beach, 29 were south of the Western beach, and 25 were trapped near the Eastern beach. Fifteen Americans were dead and eight of the nine helicopters in the first wave had either crashed or were so severely damaged they could not immediately fly again. Perhaps most tragic of all was that three hours after the initial assault began, a Thai fishing boat flying a white flag approached the island. On board the boat was the unharmed crew of the Mayaguez.
Soon, the crew was safe on board the USS Henry B. Wilson, and the focus of the Koh Tang Island operation suddenly shifted from an assault to evacuating U.S forces from the island. However, five additional helicopters were already en-route with reinforcements. They proceeded with their mission because the landing zones needed to be secured before extracting the Marines and Airmen. Also, the aircraft carrier the USS Coral Sea had moved close enough that it could support the operation. Furthermore, now that it was understood that the crew was not on the island, the close air support aircraft could strike enemy positions without fearing for the crew's safety although they had trouble distinguishing between friendly and enemy forces until the arrival of two USAF OV-10 forward air control aircraft at about 4 pm that afternoon. The OV-10s could loiter over the island for an extensive period and flew slowly enough that they could distinguish friendly and enemy positions.
Soon, the five helicopters with reinforcements arrived over Koh Tang. The first, Knife 52, approached the Eastern beach but aborted its landing and flew over the island from east to west but had to return to the mainland because of severe damage to its fuel tanks. The four other helicopters then approached the Western beach. Knife 51 and Jolly 43 successfully offloaded their Marines. Knife 51 also evacuated five wounded Marines and returned to base. After unloading its Marines, Jolly 43 conducted a mid-air refuelling and then attempted to rescue on Eastern beach. Finally, the remaining two helicopters, Jolly 11 and Jolly 12, made their approach. Jolly 11 successfully unloaded its Marines and then moved to a position where its weapons could provide cover for Jolly 12. Jolly 12 delivered its cargo of Marines and evacuated wounded. Much like the previous two helicopters, Jolly 12 sped to the mainland with its cargo of wounded marines, while Jolly 11 joined Jolly 43 in search and rescue activities on the Eastern beach. However, the enemy fire remained so intense and Jolly 43 suffered so much damage that it was forced to abort and flew on one engine to the USS Coral Sea, escorted by Jolly 11. There it underwent quick repairs to get back in the fight. At that point, the only remaining operational helicopters were Jolly 11, Jolly 12, Jolly 44, and Knife 51.
After more strafing by U.S. aircraft, Jolly 11 attempted once again to rescue the 25 Americans trapped near the Eastern beach, while Jolly 12 provided suppressing fire and attempted to locate a Marine who had been seen near the wreckage of Knife 23. Knife 51, which had returned from dropping off wounded Marines on the mainland, also assisted in the third rescue attempt on the Eastern beach. Although under intense and unremitting fire from as close as 50 meters, Jolly 11 landed on the beach and the Marines and Airmen were able to board the helicopter. It then sped toward the USS Coral Sea. As soon as Jolly 11 departed the area, an Air Force C-130 flew over the island and dropped a 15,000 pound bomb on the neck between the two beach landing zones. It was followed by an AC-130 gunship that sprayed the area with fire as Jolly 12 and Knife 51 attempted to locate the Marine seen near the wreckage of Knife 23. Unfortunately, the man could not be located and the helicopters abandoned the search. After landing on the USS Coral Sea, Jolly 11's crew realized their helicopter had sustained so much damage that it could not be flown again.
That left only three helicopters, the repaired Jolly 43 as well as Jolly 44 and Knife 51, to extract the remaining Marines from the island. The burden of extracting the more than 200 Americans on the island at night would fall to those three USAF helicopters and their crews.
Night had fallen as the three helicopters arrived over the Western beach. Knife 51 was the first into the landing zone and under intense fire from Cambodian forces managed to load a full complement of Marines and depart for the Coral Sea. Next, Jolly 43 came in and boarded 54 Marines, more than double the standard load. As Jolly 43 strained for the Coral Sea, Jolly 44 loaded more Marines and headed out to sea. Approximately 73 Marines remained on the island in darkness, surrounded by Cambodian forces and in a desperate situation. The pilot of Jolly 44, 1st Lt Robert D. Blough, decided to unload his Marines at the USS Holt, which was much closer than the USS Coal Sea. However, landing a helicopter on the deck of a destroyer at night posed a significant risk. In addition, Jolly 44 had no landing lights. Lt Blough made three attempts to land on the destroyer, and when he finally succeeded, the rotor blades of the helicopter came within two feet of the destroyer's superstructure
At that point, the ground commander radioed the OV-10s that his position was in danger of being overrun, and Jolly 44 raced back to the Western beach while an AC-130 pounded the area. Jolly 44 took on more Marines but received such damage that it was out of the fight by the time it landed on the Coral Sea. Twenty-nine Marines remained on the Western beach for extraction. Knife 51 was the next to return to the beach while the AC-130 continued to provide suppressing fire near the landing zones. After boarding 27 Marines, crewmember TSgt Wayne Fisk left the helicopter and searched the darkened tree line for any remaining Marines. He found two and the three men raced back to the helicopter which then departed the beach. Finally, all the Marines and Airmen had been evacuated. All told, 15 had been killed, 3 were missing in action, and 50 were wounded.
The Mayaguez rescue operation was undertaken with hasty planning, little intelligence and in the face a vastly more entrenched and powerful enemy than expected. Nevertheless, the crew and their ship were recovered and 230 Marines were inserted and evacuated from the island, something that could not have been done without the dedication, persistence, and bravery of the USAF helicopter forces in the face of intense and almost overwhelming enemy fire. Two Air Force crewmembers were killed during the operations and six were wounded. Four crewmen received the Air Force Cross and two others received the Silver Star. As Pacific Air Forces Commander General Louis L. Wilson Jr., wrote: "The professionalism, perseverance, and courage of American fighting men at Koh Tang was exemplified by USAF helicopter crewmembers who, despite overwhelmingly unfavourable conditions, delivered, reinforced, and then extracted some 230 Marines at the island." The hasty response of the U.S. Government to the seizure and Mayaguez occurred as a way to restore some measure of prestige to the nation after the end of U.S. military involvement in Vietnam in April, 1975. Although the military operation was not a "model of military strategy for future operations," the recovery of the ship and its crew sparked the imagination of the American people and was "greeted in the U.S. with nearly universal acceptance and even exuberance." As Gen Wilson concluded, "the United States, as a nation, had reaffirmed its will to act decisively."
The island of Koh Tang is the site of the last combat action of the Vietnam War and the only ground combat between U.S. forces and the Khmer Rouge. On May 15, 1975, U.S. Marines on board USAF helicopters landed on Koh Tang in the hope of freeing the crew of the SS Mayagüez which had been captured by Khmer Rouge gunboats on May 12, 1975. The crew of the Mayaguez was not on Koh Tang but had been taken to the Cambodian mainland and were released during the rescue operation. In the course of the operation the Khmer Rouge shot down three CH-53 helicopters on or near Koh Tang and 15 Marines and Air Force crewmen were killed & another three Marines were inadvertently left behind and later executed. An estimated 13-25 Khmer Rouge were killed during the battle.
- Captain Rowland Purser, pilot of Jolly Green 43
- First Lieutenant Donald Backlund, pilot of Jolly Green 11
- First Lieutenant Richard C. Brims, pilot of Knife 51
- Staff Sergeant Jon Harston, flight mechanic of Knife 31
- Technical Sergeant Wayne Fisk, a pararescueman on Knife 51.
- First Lieutenant Bob Blough, pilot of Jolly Green 44.
The 21st relocated to RAF Alconbury, England, and was reassigned to the 352d Special Operations Group, on 1 December 1992 (though attached to Joint Special Operations Task Force from 2 March–12 July 1993, deploying during that period to Brindisi Air Base, Italy and Incirlik Air Base, Turkey). In 1993, the 352nd Special Operations Group, RAF Mildenhall, England, and the 16th Special Operations Wing, Hurlburt Field, Florida, initially deployed people and hardware to San Vito while supporting Operation Provide Promise, a humanitarian airlift that sustained thousands of sick and starving civilians trapped by Bosnia's civil war. Eventually, as Balkan peacekeeping efforts began in earnest, unit tasking switched to Operation Deny Flight, with 352nd SOG and 16th SOW resources staying put.
Mildenhall's 21st & 7th SOS, using MH-53s and MC-130H Combat Talon IIs, also ferried troops into Sarajevo and Tuzla, and played a key role in Bosnia's 1996 elections by flying 54 United States delegates – including special envoy Richard Holbrooke – to eight polling sites scattered throughout the war-scarred country. During the delegate shuttles, Hurlburt 16th SOS Spectres patrolled travel routes, and MC-130P Combat Shadows from Mildenhall's 67th SOS refuelled helicopters and provided airborne command and control.
In 1998, an Air Force MH-53 Pave Low from the 21st Special Operations Squadron, RAF Mildenhall, England, flew out of San Vito, Italy in support of the Bosnian peacekeeping mission.
The Squadron participated in a combat search and rescue mission for the pilot of a downed F-117A stealth fighter during the air campaign. A radio transmission from a refuelling tanker stating it had received no response from his F-117A customer. Then followed reports the stealth fighter was missing or shot down. Soon after, the MC-130P Combat Shadow crew took off en-route to Bosnia-Herzegovina for a rendezvous with three rescue helicopters. Two were MH-53 Pave Lows, one from the 21st SOS and the other from the 20th SOS at Hurlburt Field, Florida. The third helicopter was an MH-60 Pave Hawk from the now inactivated 55th SOS at Hurlburt Field. The plan called for the rescue helicopters to refuel immediately before crossing the Serbian border to allow them to operate with full fuel tanks. After more than 90 minutes of orbiting close to the border, the call came from the helicopter crews for the desperately needed fuel that would enable them to continue the rescue mission. The refuelling took place at the unusually low altitude of 700 feet within three miles of the Serbian border.
A call came on the early evening of 21 May 2002 to rescue two injured passengers aboard a storm-damaged yacht, the Persuader, in rough seas approximately 450 miles off the southwest coast of England. Answering that call was a combined Team Mildenhall effort resulting in hoisting the injured man and woman aboard an MH-53M Pave Low IV helicopter and transferring them to a civilian hospital. Those involved in the daring rescue placed it among their most harrowing experiences. Because the yacht was out of range of British air and sea rescue vessels, the 21st Special Operations Squadron was called upon. The duration of the mission stretched across two days and required about 90,000 pounds of fuel via aerial refuelling. The two Combat Shadows received about 56,000 pounds during three aerial refuelings from KC-135s, and the two Pave Low helicopters received about 32,000 pounds during nine aerial refuelling’s from the two Combat Shadows. It was the longest non-stop rescue performed from the British Isles.
Special Operations Forces and rescue forces were in high demand during Operation Iraqi Freedom. The MH-53Ms from the 21st SOS conducted missions over Iraq.
With the retirement from USAF active duty of the Pave LOW MH-53J & M model helicopters, the 21st was inactivated on 9 October 2007.
The squadron
was activated again on 1 July 2019 at Yokota Air Base, Japan and equipped
with CV-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft. It is assigned to
the 353d Special Operations Group, which is stationed at Kadena Air
Base, Japan.
